Using a dataset covering a large sample of emerging economies (EMEs), we study the relationship between debt and economic performance in bad times.
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In the past few years, especially since the 2007-09 global financial crisis, emerging market economies (EMEs) have amassed significant amounts of private and public debt ( Figure 1 ). Private debt has been increasing since before the global financial crisis, but it has accelerated afterwards due to the very easy global financial conditions. Public debt dynamics instead reflects more the softening of growth and the worsening of fiscal balances, related to various shocks that have hit EMEs in the last few years, from the fall in oil prices to exchange rate depreciations. 1 These trends are different from the recent experience in advanced economies (AEs). In this latter group, the crisis set in motion a deleveraging process that is starting to slowly reduce the levels of private debt. At the same time, the fall in GDP and, to a lesser extent, the supportive fiscal interventions in some countries have brought about a surge in public debt. While in both groups of countries the levels of private and public debts are at historically high levels, there is a fundamental difference between the two. AEs are currently past the pre-crisis debt buildups, while in EMEs there is no clear sign of a slowdown in debt accumulation. Actually, some EMEs have recorded very significant increase in private debt in recent years. This is raising concerns among scholars and policymakers, especially at a time when economic activity in these countries is slowing down. in countries that have fiscal space, i.e. countries which can sustain increases in public debt without putting at risk economic and financial stability.
Quite surprisingly the available empirical evidence refers mostly to the AEs. This study is an attempt to fill this gap and to shed light on the roles played by private and public debt, and their interaction, in affecting EME's economic performance in bad times. There are a number of reasons why we should expect the transmission mechanism of large debt buildups into financial crisis and recessions to be different in EMEs as compared to AEs. First of all, EMEs have been less able than AEs to borrow externally in domestic currency (the so-called "original sin") and therefore have been more exposed to risks of sudden stops. Second, credit booms might trigger financial crisis in EMEs more easily than in AEs given their earlier stage of financial development. Finally, the way a financial crisis would play out in EMEs might be different, both because of smaller financial systems in EMEs as compared to AEs, and also as EMEs might have more limited capacity to deploy effectively monetary and fiscal policies in times of crisis.
In this paper we use a large sample of recessions which took place in AEs and EMEs in the post World War II era and make use of the local projection framework proposed by Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2016) .
In particular, we first analyze
if and to what extent buildups in private and public debt prior to recessions can influence the intensity of the slump and the speed of the recovery. In a second stage, 2 High indebted firms and households might not increase borrowing in reaction to reductions in interest rates, therefore the main tool of monetary policy might be weakened in these circumstances.
we also split recessions according to the presence or not of a banking crises, as the literature has shown that the role played by debt is more substantial in "financial recessions". Our analysis addresses three questions: (1) Do debt buildups prior to recessions predict deeper slumps and slower recoveries also in EMEs? (2) How does this link change when recessions are financial in nature (i.e. they follow credit booms)? (3) Do rapid private and public debt accumulations and ensuing crises develop differently in EMEs than in AEs?
Our findings point to an important role of debt in increasing the likelihood of financial crisis and in making the ensuing recession longer and deeper. Moreover, we find that some of these effects are more marked in EMEs as compared to AEs. In particular, our evidence shows that the higher the pre-crisis private and public debt buildups in EMEs the lower the available external financing when a crisis hits. This severely restricts the capacity of the government to sustain its economy in times of crisis, which has a substantial effect on activity. By contrary, we find that AEs are able to run counter-cyclical fiscal policy during financial crisis. That is, while in AEs debt mainly constrains the private sector, either by triggering a deleveraging phase or by limiting further private borrowing, in EMEs excessive private and public debt buildups also constrain the public sector. Indeed, our evidence show that in EMEs the larger the pre-crisis borrowing is, the stronger is the reduction in financing possibilities for governments when crises strike. 3 This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we show how buildups in private and public debt-to-GDP levels prior to recessions affect slumps and recoveries in EMEs and AEs.
In section 3, we focus on a subset of recessions-financial recessions-that occur during banking crises. In section 4, we show how excessive debt buildups in EMEs tend to be associated with tighter financing constraints and a simultaneous retrenchment of public and private demand. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Role of Private and Public Debt in Recessions
The relation between debt and macroeconomic performance has drawn renewed and Raissi (forthcoming), in particular, confirm this finding both in a sample of advanced economies and, separately, in one of emerging markets. Therefore, while the literature on private debt has reached a consensus that rapid debt accumulations lead to crisis and recessions, whether it is the level or the accumulation of public debt that is more significant in leading to crisis and recessions is less clear.
In this paper we focus on the pre-crisis increase in both private and public debt. In particular, we show how larger-than-average buildups in private and public debt-to-GDP levels in the years preceding slumps relate to the economic performance in the years following the start of the recession. This specification choice is motivated by three reasons. First, looking at changes in both private and public debt facilitates the comparisons of results related to the two debt types.
Second, this specification accommodates the presence of trends that often characterize the long-run dynamics in private debt-to-GDP levels. In particular, the ratio of global debt to GDP has seen a continuous increase globally over the past century. The development of long-run trends is partly attributable to phenomena such as financial progress, which can generate increases in debt levels without necessarily creating financial stress. From a practical point of view, the use of changes instead of levels allows the minimization of the impact of those factors. 4 Third, our background analysis (not presented in this paper) suggests that, in the case of EMEs, the use of the pre-crisis debt level as a measure of public debt imbalance does not deliver strong effects. As discussed in Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), "safe debt levels" can be quite heterogeneous, especially in developing economies. Since our focus is on this country-group, the use of the change in debt, instead of its level, allows us to circumvent this delicate issue.
There are a number of reasons why we look at EMEs and AEs separately. (Table A1 ). However, we will
show that the average drop in GDP during banking crises is surprisingly similar in EMEs and AEs, notwithstanding differences in the set of crises. Our baseline model regresses the cumulative change in the variables of interest y (e.g. real per capita GDP) in bad times on a predetermined information set.
Debt Buildups Amplify Recessions in Both EMEs and AEs
The LPM facilitates the identification of the effect of a starting condition, that is, the accumulation of debt prior to a recession, on the dynamics during the ensuing recession, by running a sequence of regressions for different horizons. Specifically, we estimate the following local projection model: Figure 2 shows the path of real per capita GDP during downturns under different scenarios in EMEs and AEs. The estimation uses information from a set of more than 300 recessions in 80 countries. First, we focus our discussion on the solid lines, which denotes our baseline. In AEs, an average recession lasts for one year and is associated with a 2 percent decrease in real per capita GDP. Between years 2 and 3, output fully recovers; at year 5, it is 5.5 percent higher than at the peak. Although the duration of the recession is the same, it is slightly deeper in EMEs, reaching a negative of -3 percent. Also, the recovery takes longer and it is only completed at year 4. Finally, five years from the start of the recession, output is only 2.2 percent higher than its pre-peak level.
6 To avoid multicollinearity, we arbitrarily drop the last country-dummy. However, notice that the dummy normalization shown above guarantees that the estimated value of the intercept is not affected by this choice.
7 This value is approximately close to the standard deviation of both private and public debt buildups (see Table A1 in the appendix for further details). The GDP paths associated to debt buildups in the (i) private, (ii) public or (iii) both sectors are respectively given by (i) θ h + 5β Overall, we find that rapid debt accumulation prior to recessions, both private and public, predicts deeper recessions and slower recoveries also in EMEs. Thus, it appears that the interaction between debt dynamics and business cycles is a global phenomenon. Moreover, such interaction appears to be particularly strong in EMEs.
How does this
The next section looks deeper into this issue by focusing on a particularly severe type of recession in which private debt plays an important role-the banking crisis or financial recession.
Banking Crises and Debt Accumulation
So far we have shown evidence that both private and public debt buildups amplify recessions in EMEs, in a way similar if not magnified with respect to AEs.
However, a large literature has pointed to the fact that private debt buildups can have more negative effects when the recession after the boom is associated with a banking crisis or more generally a financial crisis. In this case the size of the pre-crisis debt accumulation matters straightforwardly in shaping the ensuing crisis. Specifically, debt buildups affect recessions in two ways. First, they can be at the root of the slump (Boissay, Collard and Smets, 2016) . In particular, recent research has shown that excessive private sector debt is the leading indicator of banking crises, credit market disruptions that are usually followed by extremely acute downturns (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Jordà, Schularick and Taylor, 2011; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012) . Second, private debt can aggravate recessions, through amplification effects (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012) . A debt overhang can constrain the ability of households, firms, and governments to save in good times and to borrow in bad times, increasing their vulnerability to unexpected shocks. Therefore, banking crises are natural episodes to consider in addressing the impact of private debt buildups. Moreover, by focusing on banking crises, we can compare patterns in EMEs and AEs more fairly as we focus on the same type of recessions. In the previous sections, we pooled together all recessions, which have different characteristics in EMEs and AEs (for example, some recessions in EMEs are followed by sovereign crises, which are rare events in AEs).
From an econometric point of view, analyzing banking crises requires very large datasets because they occur only rarely. One option is to go back in time, taking advantage of historical records. This is the strategy followed by Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2016), where they assemble a historical dataset of 17 AEs from 1870 to
A drawback of this approach is that it is not clear to what extent crises that
occurred at the turn of the twentieth century still offer relevant lessons for today's economy. 8 A different strategy, usually made unfeasible by lack of data availability, consists of expanding the cross-section to be able to focus on a larger set of countries.
Our large dataset on private and public debt allows us to look into this unexplored dimension. Our discussion is organized into two parts. First, we check whether the dynamics of private debt is indeed a worldwide driver of banking crises. Second, we study the role played by private and public debt buildups inside and outside of banking crisis episodes.
Public Debt Buildups Do Not Predict Banking Crises...
To analyze the role of debt in predicting banking crises, we follow Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2016) and estimate the following probabilistic model:
where ln
is the log-odds ratio of a banking crisis for a country i at year t, ∆5P RY i,t−1 and ∆5P RY i,t−1 measure the average annual change in the private and public debt ratios over the five years before year t, α and α i are the intercept and a set of fixed country effects, and u i,t is the residual. Financial crises episodes B i,t are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) Table 1 shows the results for different specifications of the general model in equation (2). In particular, we report the marginal effects on the probability of a banking crisis when all predictors are at the mean. The main finding is that while private debt buildups are likely to trigger banking crises in both EMEs and AEs, public debt buildups do not predict such events.
In particular, we find that for every percentage point increase in the average annual change of private debt-to-GDP, the predicted probability of a banking crises goes up by about 0.35 -0.72 percentage points. This effect is estimated with high precision, that is, it passes the 3-standard deviations threshold. The effect associated to an increase in the average annual change of public debt-to-GDP, instead, is slightly negative around -0.25 --0.04 percentage points and is significantly different from zero at the one-standard deviation level. This result is rather surprising although in line with Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2016) . In principle, our estimate might be capturing the fact that public debt tends to rise sharply right after crises and therefore one might erroneously conclude that relatively low public debt levels make crises more likely, as discussed in Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012). However, we obtain qualitatively similar results if we drop the first 4-8 years after the start of each financial crisis. An alternative possible explanation for the negative coefficient on public debt is that countries might pre-empt banking crises via recapitalizations that, despite having an impact on the public balance sheet, reduce the probability of hitting a banking crisis.
... But Exacerbate Non-financial and Financial Recessions
To isolate the effects of private and public debt buildups during banking crises, we slightly change the benchmark local projection model as follows:
The structure of the model in equation (3) is similar to the one in equation (1).
The only difference is that now each parameter of interest is interacted with a 0-1 financial peak indicator F i,p and its complement (1 − F i,p ). 10 Accordingly, we now center all of the RHS variables with respect to their means in the non-financial and financial recession bins, respectively. In line with Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2016), pre-recession buildups in 10 We classify a peak as financial if a banking crisis erupts at the peak of the business cycle or at the start of the recession. The use of a relatively small window minimizes the risk of erroneously identifying a non-financial recession as financial, especially in highly volatile economies. However, we experimented with a larger window, allowing the peak to be classified as financial also if the banking crisis happens two years before the start of the recession (the year before the peak), without major changes in the results.
private debt are found to be more toxic in financial crises. This finding suggests that when private debt is the underlying problem driving the recession, it plays a more prominent role in slowing down the recovery. Nevertheless, the most striking results stem from the marginal effects of debt. When a country enters a banking crisis recession with rapid debt accumulations in both sectors, its economic performance tends to deteriorate further, slowing down the recovery. This result can be appreciated by looking at how the dashed lines lie below the solid lines in the right-hand-side panels in Figure 3 . Moreover, the marginal effects of debt appear especially strong in EMEs. The case of a country entering a financial recession with both debt buildups is striking. Three years after the recession is started, the drop in GDP is twice as large in EMEs than in AEs, -16 percent and -8 percent, respectively. Interestingly, our results point to a significant effect of public debt accumulations also in non-financial recessions. The blue dashed lines are consistently below the blue solid line in both EMEs and AEs. This suggests that the constraints that a pre-crisis loose fiscal stance might impose on the policymakers after the start of the crisis can be at times significant. Private debt accumulations, on the contrary, appears not to have any significant effect in amplifying the GDP fall during nonfinancial recessions. To summarize, we have shown that when we control for the same type of recessions, focusing on rare events typically associated with extremely acute downturns, we still find that rapid debt buildups can add further slack to economies and that this effect is especially amplified in EMEs. In the next section, we look into the determinants of these different results.
The Drive to Amplification

Limited Fiscal Support in EMEs...
Economic history and empirical studies have suggested that fiscal policy often tends to be pro-cyclical in EMEs (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Lane, 2003; Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004) . This differs from the experience of AEs, where fiscal policy is usually a-cyclical or countercyclical. At the same time, the literature on EMEs suggests that monetary policy in these countries is often constrained (for example, by an exchange rate policy) or limited in its effectiveness (either because the financial systems are small or because the transmission mechanism of interest rates is poor). Accordingly, the main policy tool to address cyclical considerations in many EMEs has been fiscal policy. A natural question therefore arises. Can the large and significant effects of public and private debt buildups in EMEs that we uncovered be partly due to a different response of fiscal policy during crises? To explore this question, we look at the evolution of fiscal variables during non-financial and financial recessions in EMEs and AEs. Our analysis contributes to the literature on fiscal pro-cyclicality in EMEs by linking pro-cyclicality during crisis to pre-crisis debt accumulation.
The path of fiscal variables during non-financial and financial recessions is estimated using the regression model (3). We look first at the evolution of public debt, and we then try to identify the fiscal policy stance by looking at per capita real government spending. The literature on EMEs fiscal policy has identified real per capita government spending as the best available indicator to assess the stance of fiscal policy (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004) . The reason is that the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) is not available for a large set of emerging economies going back in time. Moreover, EMEs tend to have a rather volatile growth, and more so during financial crisis, therefore output gap estimates necessary to compute the CAPB are subject to high uncertainty. At the same time, most of the impact to the fiscal accounts of recessions in EMEs works through the revenues, as these countries tend to have limited automatic stabilizers on the spending side (as for example large unemployment schemes). For all these reasons, real per-capita government spending seems to be the best measure to assess the discretionary fiscal stance, as it is the fiscal measure which is more independent from GDP fluctuations. 11
To allow for a natural comparison across variables and country groups, prior to the estimation we scale the LHS variables using y i,p , the level of real per capita GDP at the peak (Hall, 2009; Barro and Redlick, 2011) . Formally, by denoting with v real per-capita government spending or real per capita public debt, the LHS variable is now given by the following formula: Figure 4 shows how public debt, scaled by the pre-downturn level of GDP, evolves during non-financial and financial recessions, with and without the presence of larger-than-average debt buildups. Three main results emerge from this exercise. First, recessions are typically associated with increases in public debt, which tend to be larger during banking crises. Second, the increase in public debt is found to be more marked in AEs than in EMEs. This is not only the case for banking crises (Laeven and Valencia, 2013) ; it applies to non-financial recessions as well. Finally, if a country enters a non-financial or financial recession with higher private debt buildups, the increase in public debt tends to be larger.
This suggests that, especially for financial recessions, private sector support generally weights on the government balance sheet, determining a relocation of debt from private to public debt.
The analysis in Figure 4 gives a first indication that fiscal support in AEs, measured as the change in public debt with respect to pre-slump GDP levels, could be more intense than in EMEs, as the profile of public debt grows less in EMEs than in AEs after both non-financial and financial recessions. However, despite providing interesting insights on the relationship of debt, downturns, and fiscal policy, the evolution of public debt during recessions is not a clear indicator of the fiscal stance.
The public debt dynamics is largely affected by the pre-crisis fiscal position (i.e. if a country enters a financial crisis with a large fiscal deficit, the public debt will keep increasing even if the country embarks in fiscal consolidation). Accordingly, in Figure 5 we also look at the dynamics of real per capita government spending.
From looking at Figure 5 , we see that real per-capita government spending appears to be an important source of heterogeneity between EMEs and AEs. In particular, while non-financial and financial recessions in AEs are typically associated with relatively large increases in real government spending, the corresponding dynamic is more muted in EMEs. Interestingly, large buildups of both private and public debt are associated with a significant negative growth of real government spending after the start of the crisis in EMEs. During financial crises characterized by public and private debt overhangs, we find that fiscal policy tends to react asymmetrically between country-groups: while AEs increase government spending, EMEs decrease it pro-cyclically.
Overall, we find that the fiscal policy stance can act as an amplifier of debt-recession cycles, particularly in EMEs. Our analysis uses government spending as a proxy for discretionary fiscal policy, which admittedly is not completely exogenous from the GDP dynamics. Therefore, our results regarding the effect of public spending on GDP should be considered more as a finding that the two variables are correlated more than causally linked. Still, in our setup the GDP dynamics is initially mainly affected by the outbreak of a banking crisis.
Therefore, the chain of causality between larger debt buildups, deeper recessions and larger reductions in real public spending is rather clear in our setup. The start of the recession is triggered by a banking crisis which is exogenous from the impact of public spending on the economy. Reductions in public spending therefore are not the driving force of the recessions, although they certainly contribute to propagate the initial shock.
... Driven By Tighter Financial Constraints
In this section we present evidence regarding the transmission mechanism between debt accumulation and fiscal policy stance during crises in EMEs. Our goal is to assess why countries that enter a financial recession with larger debt buildups tend to cut real public spending more. In particular, we will show evidence suggesting that countries entering a financial recession with a larger accumulation of private and public debts tend to be more constrained in financing the government deficit once the crisis starts and are therefore forced to contain public spending more. This evidence is particularly in line with our analysis, as financing constraints should indeed be tighter if the country enters a crisis with larger private and/or public debt buildups.
The link that we highlight between large debt buildups on one side and, on the other, tighter financing constraints and larger reduction of public spending during crises contributes to our understanding of the nature of pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in EMEs. But some clarifications are in order. First, our result point to a pro-cyclical fiscal stance during financial crises and not in general. Gavin and Perotti (1997) But how do we assess whether financing constraints were indeed tighter for financial recessions burdened by excessive pre-crisis accumulation of debt? To provide some evidence on this issue, we follow Gavin and Perotti (1997) and look at the access to official emergency credit during financial crisis. The main source of official credit of last resort for countries is IMF loans. We therefore re-run our regressions in equation (3) using as a dependent variable the use of IMF credit. 12 IMF credit measures the net outstanding debt of a country toward the IMF and includes normal and exceptional financing under all IMF facilities. 13 Figure 6 shows that the use of IMF credit, scaled by the pre-downturn level of public debt pub i,p , is higher in EMEs, and more so during financial recessions. 14 It is particularly high during financial recessions with high private and public debt buildups. This suggests that during these types of recessions, government 12 In the spirit of local projections, we add lagged controls of the dependent variable in our set of regressors.
13 We have also performed a similar exercise with net capital flows as a share of GDP and found that they fall in financial recessions. However, net capital flows are a very imperfect measure of public financing constraints as they include also IMF credit and flows to the private sector.
14 The LHS variable in equation (3) is equal to ∆ h v i,p+h /pubi,p. This scaling allows for a fair evaluation of the loan amount.
financing needs could not be possibly met by borrowing on the market. Resort to the IMF was the only way to secure financing. Clearly, with rising public debt (Figure 4 ) and no access to financial markets, countries were not able to run counter-cyclical fiscal policy and had to restrain spending. 15 Our evidence so far underscores an important difference between EMEs and AEs, i.e. their capacity to run counter-cyclical fiscal policy during recessions and crises. This might be related to institutional differences that make EMEs more prone to public debt accumulation and that constraint their fiscal response when crises explode. In the case of AEs, Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2016) have highlighted a rather different transmission mechanism, one that works mainly through the reduction of the availability of credit during a banking crisis causing a fall in investment. A reduction in credit and investment is not inconsistent with the fiscal pro-cyclicality interpretation that we have highlighted. Indeed, in the following we report evidence showing that the fall in investment is a characteristic also of EMEs financial crisis.
As a proxy for investment we look at the National Account series for gross fixed capital formation, which includes both private and public investment. Given the higher volatility of private as opposed to public investment, gross fixed capital formation is mainly driven by private investment, whose dynamic substantially reflects credit market conditions as the financing of new capital usually requires the use of credit. Figure 7 shows that indeed countries with the most rapid debt accumulations before recessions are the ones with the highest reductions in gross fixed capital formation once the crisis starts. This effect is particularly significant after large private debt accumulations. This confirms that the fall in GDP after pre-crisis buildups in debt is accompanied by a severe decline in investment spending, particularly in EMEs.
Overall, our evidence suggests that the transmission mechanisms through which large pre-crisis debt buildups amplify recessions in EMEs is somewhat similar to that of AEs and somewhat different. It is similar to the extent that investment falls considerably. It is different to the extent that the response of fiscal policy tends to be pro-cyclical or, more generally, less supportive than in AEs.
Conclusions
In this paper we have used a large dataset on private and public debt to assess the relation between debt accumulation in good times and economic performance in bad times. Our analysis has focused in particular on emerging economies as for these countries the available evidence on the role played by debt accumulations is limited while at the same time some of them are experiencing very steep debt buildups.
We find three main results. First, debt buildups amplify recessions in both EMEs and AEs. In particular, larger-than-average private and public debt accumulations in the years prior to a recession deepen the extent and extend the duration of the drop in GDP in the following five years. Second, we find that these effects are particularly strong in EMEs, even when the analyzed recessions are restricted to those following banking crises. Third, an important source of heterogeneity between EMEs and AEs comes from fiscal policy. While AEs tend to support the decrease in private spending by increasing government expenditures during a recession, EMEs have been subject to tighter borrowing constraints that have reduced their ability to use fiscal policy to stabilize the business cycle. The difference in the fiscal stance of EMEs and AEs is particularly evident when countries enter the recession with larger-than-average private and public debt buildups.
Our results have important policy implications. While it is difficult to assess "how much is too much" for the debt-to-GDP ratios, our evidence is rather clear regarding the role of rapid buildups in credit in leading financial crisis. Moreover, once the financial crisis struck, it is difficult for an emerging economy with excessive pre-crisis private or public debt accumulations to tap the financial market. Therefore, our results underscore the importance of accumulating debt at a moderate and sustainable pace and the need to build fiscal buffers in normal times to avoid simultaneous retrenchment of private and public sector borrowing in times of crisis.
Although the emerging market landscape is rapidly changing, and our evidence is based on data over the past sixty years, we think that our findings are still relevant for understanding today's challenges. Indeed, while some emerging economies have more recently displayed a less pro-cyclical fiscal stance in normal times, most of them have not (Frankel, Vegh and Vuletin, 2013) . Moreover, if confronted with a financial crisis following financial excesses, most emerging economies would likely still be subject to external borrowing constraints and capital flights. Putting it differently, the graduation process from debt intolerance "may take decades or even centuries", since it has to be accompanied by institutional reforms and renewed creditworthiness (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003) . Finally, while some EMEs have accumulated foreign exchange reserves in the last few years and have used them to counteract exchange rate volatility, it is difficult to foresee that these will be enough to shield them from significant capital outflows and sudden stops in case of crisis. In this paper we have provided some initial evidence, but more research will be necessary to reach a comprehensive view on the causes and implications of recessions and financial crises in emerging economies. Figure A1 . Worldwide Data Coverage
A Data
Advanced Economies Emerging Market Economies
Note. The figure shows the worldwide country coverage of our dataset, which is exploited either in the local projections analysis or for the estimation of the probabilistic models. In AEs, private debt started to decline after the global financial crisis; in EMEs, it continued to increase at a fast pace. In EMEs, public debt also increased rapidly after the global financial crisis, inverting the previous trend. These data on private and public debt are combined with data on real per capita GDP from the WEO database complemented by data from the Penn Word Tables. Data on government expenditures are taken from Mauro, Romeu, Binder and Zaman (2015) . Data on IMF credit are from the IMF Financial Flows Analytics database. Finally, data on gross fixed capital formation are from the IMF IFS database, complemented in the case of a few countries by data from the WEO database. The map in Figure A1 shows the country coverage of our dataset.
B Additional Information
In this section we report additional information on some key variables used throughout the analysis. Note. The list shows the summary statistics for the debt variables that are used, at least once, in the local projection models (equations (1) and (3)). A generic country i at time p is included only if (a) all the corresponding LHS and RHS observations are available, and (b) the country in question has experienced at least two recessions in the available sample. 1973 , 1981 , 1990 , 2008 Austria 1974 , 1977 , 1980 , 1992 , 2008 , 2012 Belgium 1974 , 1980 , 1992 , 2007 , 2011 Canada 1956 , 1981 , 1989 , 2007 Czech Republic 2008 , 2011 Denmark 1973 , 1979 , 1987 , 1992 , 2007 , 2011 Finland 1975 , 1989 , 2008 , 2011 France 1974 , 1992 , 2007 , 2011 Germany 1966 , 1974 , 1980 , 1992 , 2001 , 2008 Greece 1973 , 1979 , 1986 , 1989 , 1991 , 2007 Iceland 1960 , 1966 , 1982 , 1987 , 1990 , 1994 , 2001 , 2007 Ireland 1974 , 1982 , 2007 , 2011 Israel 1988 , 1990 , 2000 , 2008 Italy 1974 , 1992 , 2002 , 2007 , 2011 Japan 1973 , 2007 , 2010 Korea 1979 , 1997 Luxembourg 2007 , 2011 Netherlands 2001 , 2008 , 2011 New Zealand 1975 , 1978 , 1982 , 2007 Norway 1977 , 1981 , 1987 Portugal 1974 , 1983 , 1992 , 2002 , 2008 , 2010 Singapore 1997 , 2000 , 2007 Slovak Republic 1998 , 2008 Slovenia 2008 , 2011 Spain 1978 , 1980 , 1992 , 2007 Sweden 1976 , 1990 , 2007 , 2011 Switzerland 1974 , 1981 , 1990 , 1994 , 2001 , 2008 United Kingdom 1957 , 1973 , 1979 , 1990 , 2007 United States 1956 , 1969 , 1973 , 1979 , 1981 , 1990 , 2000 , 2007 Emerging Market Economies Algeria 1996 , 2008 Argentina 1969 , 1974 , 1977 , 1979 , 1984 , 1987 , 1994 , 1998 , 2008 , 2011 Barbados 2000 , 2008 Belize 2004 , 2006 , 2010 , 2012 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 , 2011 Brazil 1969 , 1980 , 2000 , 2002 , 2008 Brunei 2006 , 2011 Chile 1971 , 1981 , 1998 , 2008 Colombia 1974 , 1979 , 1981 , 1997 Costa Rica 1974 , 1979 , 1984 , 1990 , 1995 , 2000 , 2008 Dominican Republic 1977 , 1981 , 1983 , 1987 , 1989 , 2002 , 2008 Ecuador 1998 , 2008 Equatorial Guinea 2005 , 2008 , 2012 Gabon 1998 , 2008 Hungary 2008 , 2011 India 1970 , 1973 , 1975 , 1978 Iran 2007 , 2011 Jamaica 1999 , 2001 , 2007 , 2011 Kuwait 1994 , 1998 , 2000 , 2006 , 2008 , 2012 Lebanon 1998 , 2001 , 2004 , 2010 Libya 1996 , 2000 Macedonia 2008 , 2011 Malaysia 1997 , 2000 , 2008 Mexico 1981 , 1985 , 1994 , 2000 , 2008 Morocco 1996 , 1998 Pakistan 2000 , 2008 Panama 1957 , 1973 , 1979 , 2000 , 2008 Paraguay 1995 , 1997 , 2008 , 2011 Peru 1975 , 1981 , 1984 , 1987 , 1991 , 1997 , 2000 , 2008 Serbia 2008 , 2011 Seychelles 1993 , 1998 , 2000 , 2007 South Africa 1971 , 1974 , 1981 , 1984 , 1989 , 1997 , 2008 Syria 1996 , 1998 , 2002 Thailand 1996 , 2008 Trinidad and Tobago 1991 , 2008 Turkey 1977 , 1979 , 1982 , 1988 , 1990 , 1993 , 1997 , 2000 , 2007 Uruguay 1981 , 1989 , 1994 , 1998 Venezuela 1970 , 1974 , 1977 , 1984 , 1988 , 1992 , 2008 , 2012 Note. The list shows the peaks (t = p) that are used, at least once, for the estimation of the local projection models. A generic country i at time p is included only if (a) all the corresponding LHS and RHS observations are available, and (b) the country in question has experienced at least two recessions in the available sample. The years in blue are non-financial peaks. The boldfaced years in red are financial peaks. 1987 , 2008 Finland 1991 France 1994 , 2008 Germany 1977 , 2008 Greece 1991 , 2008 Iceland 1985 , 1993 , 2007 Ireland 2007 Israel 1977 Italy 1990 , 2008 Japan 1992 , 1997 Korea 1983 , 1985 , 1997 Latvia 2008 Luxembourg 2008 Netherlands 2008 New Zealand 1987 Norway 1987 , 1991 Portugal 2008 Singapore 1982 Slovak Republic 1998 Slovenia 2008 Spain 1977 , 2008 Sweden 1991 , 2008 Switzerland 1991 , 2008 United Kingdom 1974 , 1984 , 1991 , 1995 , 2007 United States 1984 , 1988 , 2007 Emerging Market Economies Algeria 1990 Argentina 1980 , 1989 , 1995 , 2001 Brazil 1963 , 1985 , 1990 , 1994 Chile 1976 , 1981 China 1992 , 1998 Colombia 1982 , 1998 Costa Rica 1987 , 1994 Dominican Republic 1996 , 2003 Ecuador 1981 , 1998 Egypt 1980 , 1990 El Salvador 1989 Guatemala 1990 , 2001 , 2006 Hungary 1991 , 2008 India 1993 Indonesia 1992 , 1994 , 1997 Jamaica 1996 Jordan 1989 Kazakhstan 2008 Kuwait 1982 Lebanon 1990 Malaysia 1985 , 1997 Mexico 1981 , 1994 Morocco 1980 , 1983 Panama 1988 Paraguay 1995 , 2002 Peru 1983 , 1999 Philippines 1981 , 1983 , 1997 Poland 1991 Romania 1990 Russia 1998 , 2008 South Africa 1977 , 1989 Sri Lanka 1989 Swaziland 1995 Thailand 1980 , 1983 , 1996 Tunisia 1991 Turkey 1982 , 1991 , 1994 , 2000 Ukraine 1998 , 2008 Uruguay 1971 , 1981 , 2002 Venezuela 1978 , 1993 Note. The list shows the banking crises episodes (Bi,t = 1) that are used, at least once, for the estimation of the probabilistic models. A banking crisis episode is included only if all the corresponding LHS and RHS observations are available. Note. The table shows the marginal effects of private and public debt buildups on the probability of a banking crisis (percent), for every percentage point increase in the average annual change of private credit-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP over five years. Predicted probabilities are calculated with the assumption that all predictors in equation (2) 
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